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Abstract
Previous studies on the e®ect of government size on corruption have produced mixed
results. For the purpose of explaining these ambiguous results, our study investigates
the e®ect of government size on corruption by taking into account the role of democracy
level in each country. Using annual data from 82 countries from 1995 to 2008, the es-
timation results indicate that an increase in government size can lead to a decrease in
corruption if democracy level is su±ciently high and, in contrast, can lead to an increase
in corruption if it is too low. As a robustness check, estimations using a di®erent index
of corruption and a di®erent proxy for government size are also conducted. The results
show that our main results are robust. Furthermore, to deal with endogeneity problems,
we conduct an instrumental variable estimation, the results of which support our main
results. These ¯ndings provide some important implications for policymakers seeking to
conduct government intervention without aggravating corruption.
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1 Introduction
Corruption is a phenomenon widely observed in both developed and developing countries.
Since it has various e®ects on society, corruption is a central topic in both political science
and economics. In recent years, there have been a large number of empirical studies on
corruption which can be generally classi¯ed into two categories. One stream of study focuses
on the e®ects of corruption on economic performance, particularly economic growth, FDI, or
the outcome of speci¯c public expenditures (e.g., Mauro, 1995, 1998; M¶endez and Sep¶ulveda,
2006; Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008). The other looks at the determinants of corruption (e.g.,
Goel and Nelson, 1998; La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Serra,
2006; Del Monte and Papagni, 2007; Billger and Goel, 2009; Saha et al., 2009). Although
some consensus is obtained regarding the determinants of corruption (see Serra, 2006), the
role of some factors which seem to be related to corruption remains unclear. Our paper focuses
on one such factor, government size, and its in°uence on corruption.
While minimum public services provided by the government, such as security, provision
of infrastructure, and consolidation of the legal system, are necessary and important in sta-
bilizing a country, it is well-known that an oversized government causes various ine±ciencies.
If government size is viewed as the degree of government intervention in remedying market
failures, excessive intervention may inhibit market competition, i.e., government failures. For
instance, Lal (1985) points out the misallocation of resources by a government, and social
scientists such as Mills (1986) argue that government failure is more problematic than mar-
ket failure. Government size can also be viewed as the number of bureaucrats and/or their
expenses, such as wages and salaries. Niskanen (1971) de¯nes government bureaucrats as
agents seeking to maximize the size of their budgets, and points out that they have no incen-
tive to be e±cient. Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) indicate that government failures such as
corruption are the by-products of government intervention, and in order to reduce corruption,
higher wages are necessary to prevent bureaucrats from becoming corrupt. In this way, the
relationship between the size of the government and its ine±ciency, including corruption, has
been an important topic in economics.
More precisely, there are two di®erent ideas regarding the relationship between corruption
and government size, which are empirically controversial. First, an increase in government size
provides more opportunity for political rent-seeking, making the politicians and bureaucrats
be more corrupt (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999). This viewpoint is suggested by the \crime
and punishment" model in Becker (1968). In other words, bigger governments increase the
expected payo® of illegal activities and, as a result, give an incentive leading to more illegal
activities such as corruption. Similar to this viewpoint, Alesina and Angeletos (2005) propose
a theoretical model where bigger governments increase the possibility for corruption. They
argue that when income inequality and unfairness are generated by corruption, the poor
support redistributive policy intending to correct inequality and injustice, and the rich also
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support it because they can extract more rent resulting from an increase in government size.
As a result, the redistributive e®ect becomes small, and large corruption remains. Goel and
Nelson (1998) empirically show that the size of the state and local governments in the United
States has a strong positive in°uence on corruption.1
Second, in contrast to the above point of view, some prominent studies suggest that since
a larger government promotes a system of checks and balances and strengthens accountability,
an increase in government size must reduce corruption. This viewpoint is inferred from the
fact that developed countries generally have bigger governments and are less corrupt than
developing countries. Particularly, for Scandinavian countries, government size is larger than
that of other developed countries, but they are the least corrupt. La Porta et al. (1999) and
Billger and Goel (2009) provide evidence supporting this viewpoint. Speci¯cally, Billger and
Goel (2009), using quantile regression, show that an increase in government size leads to a
reduction in corruption at almost all degrees of corruption.2
As seen above, there are mixed results concerning the relationship between corruption
and government size. Focusing on the role of democracy, the aim of this paper is to examine
the relationship between corruption and government size using cross-country data from 82
countries for the period from 1995 to 2008. Democracy is taken into account because it may
play an important role a®ecting corruption. Speci¯cally, with the matureness of democracy,
various monitoring mechanisms, such as free and fair elections and media freedom in a country,
will function well. In such circumstances, the incumbent may lose power if they are involved
in major corruption.3 The development of democracy can be regarded as an enhancement of
checks and balances. Then, we can derive a hypothesis about the relationship between the
size of the government and corruption as follows. In non-democratic or transitional countries,
an increase in government size can aggravate corruption since monitoring on the government
is weak. In contrast, when democracy is su±ciently consolidated, larger government size
leads to a reduction in corruption because the monitoring mechanisms function well and can
restraint corruption conducted by the politicians and bureaucrats.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the estimation
methodology and data. Section 3 shows the main empirical analysis and section 4 provides
the robustness analysis. Section 5 concludes.
1Goel and Nelson (1998) also indicate that the e®ect of non-military federal spending on corruption is
negative. They point out the possibility that there are signi¯cant nonlinearities in the relationship between
corruption and government size.
2Regarding the most corrupt countries, however, the coe±cient of government size is insigni¯cant and
positive. Billger and Goel (2009) argue that this might imply that minimum machinery of the government is
necessary for ¯ghting corruption.
3Rose-Ackerman (1999) argues that in democratic countries, parties and politicians need to ¯nance political
campaigns and, therefore, an election is vulnerable to special interest in°uence and is not su±cient to monitor
the government. Then, to hold the government more accountable, a separation of the powers and a restriction
of the powers through the mass media is needed. The index of democracy used for the analysis in this paper
is created, considering these factors.
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2 Estimation methodology and data
The main focus of our study is to investigate the e®ects of government size on corruption,
taking into account the role of democracy. To achieve this purpose, the estimation equation
is speci¯ed as:
Corruptioni = ¯0 + ¯1Government sizei + ¯2GDP per capita (1)
+ ¯3Democracyi + ¯4Government sizei £Democracyi + ¯5Xi + ui,
where u is a standard error term. X is a set of variables that may in°uence corruption,
containing economic freedom and British legal origin. A more detailed explanation of the data
and descriptive statistics are reported in Tables A2 and A3 of the Appendix. All variables
except for the dummy variable for British legal origin are in natural logarithmic form. The
rationale underlying our speci¯cation is as follows. GDP per capita is shown to have a
signi¯cant in°uence on corruption in most previous studies. The inclusion of economic freedom
as a component of the control variable vector, X, in the estimation equation is motivated by
the fact that economic freedom in°uences corruption level as indicated by previous studies
such as Saha et al. (2009). These two factors are considered to be the economic determinants
of corruption. Generally, the corruption level in a country is expected to decrease when per
capita income and/or economic freedom levels increase. Besides these economic factors, we
also consider political and cultural factors as the determinants of corruption since corruption
levels in each country depend on these factors as well, as indicated by previous studies. The
inclusion of the political factor, democracy, in the estimation equation is motivated by La
Porta et al. (1999) and Adserµa et al. (2003), who point out that a high democracy level
reduces corruption.4 The inclusion of the cultural factor, British legal origin, as a component
of the control variable vector, X, is based on La Porta et al. (1999). This factor is also
found to be a signi¯cant determinant of corruption in other previous studies such as Treisman
(2000). Countries adopting a British legal origin tend to be less corrupt.
Furthermore, to capture the role of democracy in the e®ects of government size on cor-
ruption, we add the interaction term between government size and democracy. This approach
enables us to examine how democracy level in°uences the e®ect of government size on cor-
ruption, which is the main purpose of our study.
The annual data from 82 countries over the period from 1995 through 2008 is employed for
the estimation. The list of countries in our sample is provided in Table A1 of the Appendix.
We use a 5-year average (1995 to 1999, 2000 to 2004, and 2005 to 2008) for each variable in
order to mitigate short-term economic °uctuations. We use two corruption indices released
by the Transparency International (TI) and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) for
4Saha et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence that democracy increases corruption when the degree of
economic freedom is too low.
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our estimation. In addition, we consider two proxies for government size, which are the share
of general government ¯nal consumption expenditures in GDP, and the share of population
in the public sector to total population. The index of democracy is obtained by taking the
average of political rights and civil liberties provided by the Freedom House.
As a benchmark, we report the OLS estimation results. For the fact that the OLS estimator
may be biased due to endogeneity problems resulting from reverse causality, omitted variables,
or measurement error, we conduct the instrumental variable (IV) estimation to deal with these
problems, using the presidential system and the share of population who are under age 15 in
the total population as the instruments for government size. The selection of these variables
as the instruments is based on several prominent works. Speci¯cally, Persson and Tabellini
(1999, 2003) show that presidential regimes are associated with government size, and Shelton
(2007) considers the share of population who are under age 15 as a determinant of government
size.
3 Main empirical results
Table 1 presents the estimation results when the corruption perception index released by the
TI is used as the corruption variable, and the share of general government ¯nal consumption
expenditures in GDP is used as the proxy for government size. In column (1), in which we
control for per capita income and democracy, the e®ect of government size on corruption is
signi¯cantly negative. Column (2) shows the results when economic freedom and British legal
origin are added. The results suggest that government size still has a signi¯cant negative
impact on corruption. This ¯nding is in line with that of Billger and Goel (2009) who use
quantile regression and indicate that larger government size results in less corruption at almost
all degrees of corruption.
[Table 1 here]
However, in the above analysis, the e®ect of government size may not be su±ciently
captured. The reason is that, as described in section 1, an increase in government size may
give politicians and bureaucrats more opportunity for larger political rent-seeking and, as a
result, corruption may worsen. Furthermore, although bigger government size may increase
corruption in some countries, as a whole the negative relationship between government size
and corruption may conceal this positive e®ect if the interaction term is not included in the
estimation. Then, the level of democracy penetration in a country can be considered to be
a main factor in decreasing corruption in a country, as shown by Serra (2006). Given these,
to address the e®ect of government size on corruption more precisely, we take into account
the interaction e®ect between government size and democracy. This interaction term allows
us to evaluate how the democracy level in a country in°uences the e®ect of government size
on corruption. Columns (3) and (4) provide the results when the interaction term between
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government size and democracy is added. The results indicate that the interaction term has a
signi¯cant negative impact, implying that the partial e®ect of government size on corruption
is decreasing with the level of democracy.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, endogeneity problems must be addressed because their
existence can bias the OLS estimators. In dealing with these problems, we conduct the
IV estimation, using the presidential system and the share of population under age 15 in
the total population as the instruments for government size. While these two variables are
important determinants of government size, as indicated by Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2003)
and Shelton (2007), they may not have a direct e®ect on corruption. Columns (5) and (6)
present the IV estimation results. The validity of the instruments is also con¯rmed from the
econometric tests. Stock and Yogo (2005) indicate a problem of weak instruments and develop
the critical value in F-statistics in the ¯rst stage regression. The values of the F-statistics in
our analysis are well above those in Stock and Yogo (2005) in both columns (5) and (6).5 In
addition, the Sargan test of overidenti¯cation cannot reject the orthogonality conditions at 5
percent signi¯cance level. In columns (5) and (6), the coe±cients of government size and its
interaction term with democracy are signi¯cant. Given the results of the positive coe±cient
of government size and the negative coe±cient of its interaction term with democracy, the
partial e®ect of government size on corruption decreases with the level of democracy. In the
case of column (6), the level of democracy such that this partial e®ect is zero is 1.49, which
is approximately on the 20th percentile from the least democratic countries in our sample.6
In other words, the partial e®ect of government size on corruption is positive if the level of
democracy is above the threshold of 1.49, and it is negative if the level of democracy is below
the threshold (see Fig. 1).7 For example, evaluated at the average value from 2005 to 2008, the
partial e®ect of government size on corruption is around zero in Zambia. In Malaysia where
the democracy level is lower than the threshold, this e®ect is negative, implying that further
government intervention causes corruption to increase. Alternatively, in Greece, where the
democracy level is above the threshold level, corruption is reduced by increasing government
size.
[Fig. 1 here]
These ¯ndings provide an explanation for the mixed results of the e®ect of government
size on corruption. In the countries where democracy penetrates su±ciently, increasing gov-
ernment size causes a reduction in corruption because the government is monitored by free
and fair elections or independent mass media in these countries. In contrast, in the coun-
5They are also satis¯ed with the earlier rule of thumb developed by Staiger and Stock (1997), who suggest
that the F-statistic in the ¯rst stage should exceed 10.
6The value of the level of democracy is in natural logarithmic form.
7Evaluated at the average value from 2005 to 2008, there are 15 countries for which the democracy level
is below the threshold value. In the order from less democratic to more democratic countries, these countries
are Belarus, Russia, Pakistan, Nepal, Fiji, Uganda, Thailand, Gambia, Singapore, Bangladesh, Venezuela,
Malaysia, Malawi, Sri Lanka, and Guatemala.
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tries where democracy level is too low, the monitoring mechanisms do not function well, and
as a result, larger government size results in worse corruption. Since corruption hinders in-
vestment and economic growth, as pointed out by many studies such as Mauro (1995), it is
indispensable, especially for developing countries, to reduce corruption in order to stimulate
investment and promote economic growth. Government intervention in economic activity is
frequently needed in developing countries due to the presence of market failures. This inter-
vention sometimes causes an increase in government size. The results from our study indicate
that an increase in government size can lead to an increase in corruption levels if democracy
level is too low. Therefore, through promoting democracy, if the mechanisms of checks and
balances in a country, such as free and fair elections and a free and independent mass media,
are well established, government intervention, which is necessary in resource reallocation and
income redistribution to remedy market failures, does not necessarily increase corruption.
4 Robustness analysis
In this section, we check the robustness of our main empirical results in two manners. First,
the estimations with a di®erent corruption index obtained from the WGI are conducted.
Second, another proxy of government size, which is the share of population in the public
sector to total population, is considered.
Table 2 presents the estimation results when the WGI's corruption index is used as the
dependent variable.8 The speci¯cations and the instruments are the same as those in Table 1.
In columns (1) through (5), the sign and signi¯cance of the estimated coe±cients are similar
to those in Table 1. In column (6), where we conduct the IV estimation by considering the
interaction term between government size and democracy, the coe±cients of government size
and its interaction term are signi¯cantly positive and negative respectively, which are also the
same as those in Table 1. The threshold of the level of democracy is 1.55, which is similar
to that in Table 1's column (6). Therefore, our empirical results in the previous section are
robust for corruption indices.
[Table 2 here]
Next, we conduct the estimations using another proxy for government size|the share of
population in the public sector to total population.9 The estimation results are reported in
Table 3, in which the speci¯cations are the same as those in Tables 1 and 2.10 Although
8The TI and the WGI create their corruption indices based on di®erent original sources. The TI's corruption
perception index captures perceptions of overall corruption among public o±cials and politicians. The WGI's
corruption index captures the perceptions of the extent to which the public workers or o±cials in a country abuse
their public power for their private interests, including both grand and petty corruption. Grand corruption
involves senior o±cials, ministers, and heads of state and petty corruption entails immigration o±cials, customs
clerks, policemen, and so on.
9Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) consider the share of population in the public sector to total population as
the proxy for government size in their theoretical examination on market failure and government intervention.
10Due to the fact that data on the share of population in the public sector is few, our sample in this analysis
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the coe±cient of government size is not signi¯cant in column (1), it is signi¯cant when we
take into account economic freedom and British legal origin in column (2). In column (3),
where the interaction term is added, the coe±cients of government size and its interaction
term are signi¯cantly positive and negative respectively. While in column (4), the coe±cient
of government size is not signi¯cant, its interaction term is signi¯cantly negative and the null
hypothesis that the coe±cients of government size and its interaction term are simultaneously
zero can be rejected in the F-test at 5 percent signi¯cance level. In columns (5) and (6),
we also conduct the IV estimation using the same instruments for government size. As in
the case of column (4), in column (6), although the coe±cient of government size is not
signi¯cant, the coe±cient of interaction terms between government size and democracy is
signi¯cantly negative and, in addition, we can reject the null hypothesis that the coe±cients
of government size and its interaction term with democracy are jointly zero in the F-test at
5 percent signi¯cance level. The threshold level of democracy separating the partial e®ect of
government size on corruption into positive and negative is 1.43, which is similar to that in
column (6) of Tables 1 and 2.
[Table 3 here]
It is clear that the main empirical results are robust, even if a di®erent corruption index
and a di®erent proxy for government size are used. Our ¯ndings suggest that, while an
increase in government size worsens corruption in the countries where democracy level is too
low, bigger government size reduces corruption in the countries in which democracy penetrates
su±ciently.
5 Conclusion
Previous studies have provided mixed results for the relationship between corruption and
government size. As an attempt to explain these ambiguous results, we investigate the e®ect
of government size on corruption, taking into account the role of democracy. Our estima-
tion results indicate that an increase in government size decreases corruption if democracy
su±ciently penetrates, and, in contrast, increases corruption if the democracy level is too
low. These results are robust even if we use a di®erent index of corruption and a di®erent
proxy for government size. Furthermore, in dealing with endogeneity problems, we conduct
the instrumental variable estimation, the results of which support our main results.
Our ¯ndings have important implications for policymakers in dealing with policies to re-
duce corruption. Although government intervention can remedy market failures and play an
important role in economic development, it can lead to an increase in government size. If
democracy does not work well in a country, larger government size may lead to a worsen-
ing of corruption. In order to utilize the government's intervention role without increasing
includes only 50 countries.
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corruption, the promotion of democracy is indispensable, because with the progress of democ-
racy, checks and balances will function well, making an increase in government size cause a
reduction in corruption.
Appendix
A1 List of countries in the sample
Our sample contains 82, 81, and 50 countries in the estimation in Tables 1, 2, and 3, respec-
tively, as described in Table A1. The number in parentheses indicates the number of the table
in which the country is included for the estimation. Due to data availability, the sample size
is di®erent in each regression.
[Table A1 here]
A2 Data de¯nitions and sources
[Table A2 here]
[Table A3 here]
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Fig. 1: The partial e®ect of government size on corruption
Notes:
1. This ¯gure is illustrated based on the result of column (6) in Table 1.
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